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ARGUMENT 
The appellants file this memorandum in reply to the brief of James C. 
Ziter. 
I. 
REPLY TO ZITER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT 
TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW." 
In paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 (page 6) of Ziter's Statement of the Facts Relevant 
to Issues Presented for Review, Ziter does not set forth facts, but conclusions. 
This confusion of facts with conclusions is a harbinger of the circular reasoning 
used by Ziter throughout his Reply Memorandum. 
Paragraph 6. Contrary to Ziter's conclusory statements in paragraph 6 of 
his Statement of Facts, paragraph 11 of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement (the 
"Agreement" or the "EMSA") states: 
11. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS 
OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL 
PROVISIONS SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE 
HEREOF HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE BUYER 
AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO 
THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE. 
It is a fact that no language added to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
form makes any specific reference to this paragraph 11 or to the Seller's express 
warranties contained in General Provision "C" of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement. (The Earnest Money Sales Agreement is at R.6.) 
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Paragraph 7. Again, Ziter's statements in paragraph 7 of his Statement of 
Facts are conclusions on ultimate issues and not statements of fact. Contrary to 
Ziter's statement, paragraph 6 of the Agreement does not state that "Buyer 
accepts property 'as is'." In fact, paragraph 6 of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement states: 
6. SELLER'S WARRANTIES. In addition to 
warranties contained in Section C, the following items 
are also warranted: None 
Exceptions to the above and Section C shall be limited 
to the following: None 
(Emphasis added). 
It is in this paragraph 6 that the parties expressly state their agreement that 
there are no exceptions to the express warranties in Section C. The Section C 
warranties are the basis of plaintiffs' claims. 
Paragraph 8. Ziter's statement that "the boiler plate warranties made in 
fine print on the back side of the Agreement are inconsistent with the typed in 
terms on the front of the Agreement. . ." is not a statement of fact but a statement 
of conclusion or opinion. As set forth above, in paragraph 6 of the Agreement 
the parties expressly agreed that there were no exceptions to the Seller Warranties 
in Section C, the same warranties which are the subject of this litigation. (R.6, 
7). 
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II. 
THE EXPRESS WARRANTIES AT ISSUE IN THIS 
LITIGATION WERE NOT EXCLUDED BY THE 
EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT. 
Ziter, the seller of the Hollywood Apartments, places great emphasis upon 
the fact that the Earnest Money Sales Agreement is a pre-printed form, somehow 
implying that agreement should be construed against Grossgold, the buyer. This 
argument is an about face from the normal posture of a Seller. In this case, it is 
the Seller ("Ziter") who had the sole and exclusive right to determine the content 
of the sales contract who seeks to avoid express warranties clearly stated within 
the Agreement. This effort is made in spite of the fact that language added by 
the parties to paragraph 6 of the EMSA clearly states that there are no exceptions 
to the very warranties which the Seller seeks to avoid. 
Ziter's argument that language added to paragraph 1(e) of the EMSA is 
inconsistent with the express warranties, and therefore supersedes the warranties 
(pages 9 and 10 of Ziter's Memorandum) is a classic example of circular 
reasoning. The argument assumes the conclusion, (i.e. - that the statement in 
paragraph 1(e) is inconsistent with the express warranties) as the beginning point. 
In fact, paragraph 1(e) of the EMSA states that it is "subject to Section 1(c) and 
6 below." Paragraph 6 of the EMSA specifically provides that there are no 
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exceptions to the express warranties that are the subject of this litigation. Thus, 
the "as is" language in paragraph 1(e) remains "subject to" the express warranties 
that are the subject of this action. 
As discussed above, this EMS A was not a contract forced upon Ziter by the 
Buyer. Ziter, as the Seller had exclusive control over the language of the EMSA. 
If he did not approve of the language, he was not obliged to sign the Agreement. 
If Ziter intended to exclude express and implied warranties, he could have added 
the simple language that: "all warranties, express or implied, are excluded." If 
he had done this, the Buyer would not have entered into the EMSA. (Affidavit 
of Bruce Manka, R.69). Instead of doing this, the Seller asks this court to 
rewrite the Agreement by ignoring the language in paragraph 1(e) and paragraph 
6, the language that makes the "as is" statement "subject to" the express 
warranties, none of which were excluded. (Paragraph 6 of EMSA, R.6). 
Ziter discusses the Tibbitts v. Openshaw case, 425 P.2d 160 (Utah 1980) 
only in passing, apparently acknowledging that Tibbitts addresses only implied, 
and not express warranties. In Tibbitts. the Supreme Court did not have before 
it the form EMSA and was not addressing express warranties. In short, Tibbitts 
is not dispositive of any issue before this court. 
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Ziter appears to rely next (page 10) upon the Utah UCC to support his 
broad interpretation of the "as is" language in the EMS A. Ziter fails to 
acknowledge, however, that the UCC language in U.C.A. §70-2-316 addresses 
only implied warranties, and that the warranties that Ziter seeks to have excluded 
in this case are express warranties. Ziter has offered this court no authority from 
the UCC in support of his apparent argument that "as is" language can also 
disclaim express warranties. The Washington Court of Appeals, in Olmstead v. 
Mulder. 863 P.2d 1355 rev. den. 875 P.2d 635 (Wash. App. 1993), reached a 
contrary result, rejecting Ziter's argument. 
Ziter's argument (page 11) that the "as is" language excludes the express 
warranties is entirely inconsistent with the language added to paragraph 6 of the 
EMS A. Paragraph 6 (which is set forth in its entirety on page 2) states that there 
are no exceptions to the express warranties that are the basis for plaintiffs' 
Complaint. Ziter has not suggested to this court any other interpretation for 
paragraph 6. 
Contrary to Ziter's assertion (at page 13 of his Memorandum), plaintiffs do 
not claim that express warranties can never be disclaimed. Express warranties 
can be disclaimed. The facts in this case are, however, that paragraph 6 of the 
EMS A says that there are no exceptions to the express warranties. In the context 
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of this EMSA, instead of saying that there were no additional warranties and no 
exceptions to the warranties in Section C, the parties could have disclaimed the 
express warranties by stating: "all of the express warranties contained in Section 
C are excluded." This simple statement is not contained anywhere within the 
EMSA. 
In Olmstead v. Mulder. 863 P.2d 1355, rev. den. 875 P.2d 635 (Wash. 
App. 1993), the Washington court concluded that "as is" language which may be 
sufficient to override implied warranties cannot override express warranties 
contained in an agreement unless those express warranties are specifically 
identified. The reasoning in Olmstead is consistent with this state's decision in 
Tibbitts. supra, where our Supreme Court confirmed that "as is" language is 
sufficient to overcome implied warranties. 
At page 14 of Ziter's memorandum, Ziter attempts to argue that the 
Olmstead. supra, decision is inconsistent with Tibbitts. supra. If Tibbitts dealt 
with express warranties, which it does not, Ziter's point might be well taken. His 
attempt to claim that Olmstead is inconsistent with Tibbitts ignores the distinction 
between express and implied warranties, a distinction that Ziter fails to make 
throughout his entire memorandum. 
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The plaintiffs acknowledge that Olmstead is not controlling authority in 
Utah, but Ziter's efforts to distinguish the reasoning and the result in Olmstead 
fail. Ziter argues first that because the "as is" terms were contained in an 
addendum in Olmstead they are not as effective as the "as is" language in his 
EMS A. The opposite conclusion would appear to be more probable. In this 
case, the "as is" language appears in a limited context in the provision dealing 
with the physical inspection of the property. In Olmstead. the "as is" language 
appeared in a separate addendum at the end of an agreement where it could be 
argued that it overrides all of the warranties in the agreement. And yet, the 
Washington Court concluded that the "as is" language did not override the 
expressed warranties. 
Ziter argues that the commercial status of the Hollywood Apartments 
distinguishes Olmstead because caveat emptor applies to commercial properties. 
Ziter has not explained how caveat emptor could possibly apply where Ziter gave 
express warranties for the plumbing, heating, air conditioning, ventilating, and 
electrical systems at the Hollywood Apartments. Ziter's express warranty was 
that these systems would be "in sound or satisfactory working condition at 
closing." (EMSA, R.6). Plaintiffs are aware of no authority which supports the 
proposition that caveat emptor overrides express warranties. The opposite 
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appears to be true. Accord: Schafir v. Harrington. 879 P.2d 1384 (fn. 12, page 
1389) (Utah App. 1994). The case relied upon by Ziter in support of his caveat 
emptor argument, Utah State Medical Association v. Utah State Employees Credit 
Union, 655 P.2d 643 (Utah 1982) does not deal with an Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement. Instead, it addresses who bears the risk of loss for property 
subsequent to closing but prior to delivery of the property. These issues do not 
exist in this case. 
In a further effort to distinguish Olmstead. Ziter argues, without support 
from the record, that the parties in this case were real estate agents "who were 
fully aware of the use of terms 'buyer accepts property as is' to disclaim 
warranties" (page 16). In reality, one of the parties to the Agreement that was 
closed, Grossgold, is not a real estate agent. Manka's affidavit (R.69, paragraph 
6) states that he never understood that the "as is" language disclaimed express 
warranties within the Agreement. Ziter argues that a further distinguishing factor 
in Olmstead is the use of the Single Family Residence Property Information form 
which was signed by the seller in that case. Perhaps Ziter is arguing that a 
warranty is effective only if it is made in writing at least twice during the course 
of the sales transaction. This argument does little to distinguish the fact that Ziter 
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expressly warranted that the heating and plumbing systems would be in "sound 
or in satisfactory working condition at closing." 
The Olmstead court concluded that the reasoning of the Uniform 
Commercial Code limiting an "as is" disclaimer to implied warranties was 
persuasive and should be applied to cases involving cases of realty: 
We interpret the "as is" clause to be consistent with the 
express warranties relating to the sewer system and well. 
It makes no reference to these express warranties, and 
therefore cannot be fairly read as disclaiming them. The 
clause fails because it does not state with particularity 
the items being disclaimed. (863 P.2d 1359-1360) 
Ziter's discussion of the Montana case of Wagner v. Cutler. 757 P.2d 779 
(Mont. 1988), misses the point. In Wagner, the LDS Church was selling the 
home of a former employee. The LDS Church had purchased the house from the 
employee when the employee was relocated. The sales agreement used by LDS 
contained a statement that the purchaser accepted the property and appliances "as 
is". The LDS Church contended that it had no knowledge of any defects and that 
the "as is" clause should have, at a minimum, triggered the purchasing party's 
obligation to thoroughly investigate the property. The Montana court held that 
this language did not shift the burden to the buyer to be responsible for latent 
defects. Nothing further is claimed by the plaintiffs for Wagner. Wagner 
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supports the conclusion that "as is" language is not a cure all for a seller's broken 
warranty. 
Ziter appears to argue at page 17 of his memorandum that the only manner 
that this court can give meaning to all of the words added to the Agreement is to 
conclude that the "as is" language excludes all express warranties. What Ziter 
fails to address in this discussion is the following: 
A. If the "as is" language is interpreted to control the express 
warranty, then no meaning is given to paragraph 6 of the EMS A which 
states: 
6. SELLER'S WARRANTIES. In addition to 
warranties contained in Section C, the following items 
are also warranted: None . 
Exceptions to the above and Section C shall be limited 
to the following: None . 
(Emphasis added). 
B. The argument asks this court to read the "subject to" language 
in paragraph 1(e) out of the EMSA. 
Paragraph 1(e) states that: 
(e) BUYER INSPECTION. Buyer has made a visual 
inspection of the property and subject to Section 1(c) 
above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical 
condition, except: None. Buyer accepts property "as 
is\ 
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An integral part of each of this provision is that the property remains subject to 
the Seller's express warranty for the plumbing and heating systems. 
C. The argument asks the Court to read paragraph O out of the 
agreement. Paragraph O states that the express warranties survive closing. 
D. It asks the Court to ignore paragraph C, which contains the 
express warranties. 
Ziter asks this court to harmonize the Agreement by reading out of it at 
least four critical paragraphs. No rule of construction supports such a result. 
Ziter suggests that limiting the "as is" language in paragraph 1(e) to implied 
warranties makes it redundant because of language in General Provision B. Just 
because parties write the same words into an agreement where the words are 
already present does not mean that some new meaning has to be attached to them. 
The same words should mean the same thing. Even if the "as is" is repetitive, 
the response should not be to ignore or read other language out of the Agreement. 
U.C.A. §70A-2-316(l) suggests that in this circumstance, the negation or 
limitation is inoperative. 
The most logical construction of the "as is" language is that it excludes only 
implied warranties. This construction avoids the need to read other paragraphs 
out of the EMSA. The construction is consistent with the ordinary interpretation 
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of "as is" that it excludes only implied warranties. Tibbitts v. Openshaw. supra, 
Olmstead v. Mulder, supra. U.C.A. §70A-2-316. There is absolutely no support 
in the record, from industry standards or case authority, that the use of "as is" in 
the EMSA disclaims the express warranties which are the subject of the 
Complaint. 
In subpoint E, page 18 of his Memorandum, Ziter argues that paragraph 11 
of the EMSA precludes the express warranties in subsection C from being 
incorporated into the Agreement. Paragraph 11 states: 
11. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE 
INDICATED ABOVE. THE GENERAL PROVISIONS SECTIONS 
ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY 
THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO 
THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE. (Emphasis added). 
None of the language added to the EMSA by the parties makes any reference to 
paragraph 11. None of the added language makes any reference to the express 
warranties in paragraph C of the General Provisions. Again, Ziter uses circular 
reasoning to argue that the "as is" language addresses the paragraph C warranties. 
Finally, Ziter argues t hat his agreement to discount the sales price by 
$5,000 for a new boiler confirms his legal claim that the "as is" language 
disclaims even the express warranties. This case was dismissed on the pleadings. 
There is no evidence in the record as to why the Seller agreed to reduce the down 
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payment. It is as logical to conclude that if the Buyer could have discovered the 
leaks in the plumbing and heating system that were buried within the walls and 
the floor of the apartment that he would have offered an even lower price and that 
the Seller would have accepted it. It is as logical to conclude that Grossgold 
relied upon the express warranties made by Ziter to save each of the parties the 
cost and inconvenience of tearing up walls and floors to determine the status of 
the entire system. 
This case is before this Court from a judgment granting a motion to dismiss 
the complaint. There has been no evidence taken in this case. There is no record 
to show what the parties intended or believed was agreed to. While it is the 
plaintiffs' position, first and foremost, that the "as is" clause does not and cannot 
exclude the express warranties, at a minimum, there is an ambiguity which can 
be resolved only by testimony and trial. The ambiguity is this: 
(i) Paragraph 6 of the EMSA states that there are no exceptions 
to the express warranties; and 
(ii) Paragraph 1(e) of the Agreement states, according to Ziter, 
that the sale is "as is". 
In granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, as the trial court 
did in this case, the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable 
13 
to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor. Mounteer v. 
Power and Light Company. 823 P.2d 1055. (Utah 1991). The trial court did not 
do this. It resolved all inferences about what "as is" means contrary to law and 
contrary to the reasonable inferences to be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the District Court dismissing the 
complaint should be set aside in its entirety, this court should determine as a 
matter of law that the express warranties for the plumbing and heating systems 
were not excluded, and the matter should be remanded to the District Court for 
trial on the issue of plaintiffs' damages. 
DATED this J f e day of rh}J , 1995. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
M 
Keith W. Meade 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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